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Ten-Year Impacts of Individual Development 
Accounts on Homeownership:  
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment 
 
 
This paper presents evidence from a randomized field experiment to evaluate the long-term impact of an incentive for 
household saving.  We examine the effect on homeownership of an Individual Development Account (IDA) program 
which ran from 1998 to 2003 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.  The IDA program provided low-income households with 
financial education and matching funds for qualified savings withdrawals, including a 2:1 match for housing down 
payments.  About 90% of treatment group members opened IDA accounts, and contributions averaged about $1,800.  
Homeownership rates for both treatment and control groups increased substantially throughout the experiment.  Prior 
work shows that from 1998 to 2003, homeownership rates increased more for treatment group members than for 
controls.  We show in this paper, however, that control group members caught up rapidly with the treatment group after 
the experiment ended, so that the IDA program had no significant effect on homeownership rates among the full 
sample in 2009 and had no effect on the duration of homeownership during the study period.  The program had a 
positive impact on homeownership rates among those with above-sample median income ($15,840) at the time they 
entered the program, but not on other subgroups that we tested.  
Key words: American Dream Demonstration, IDA, homeownership, asset effects, savings, low-income households 
Introduction 
How can public policy help low-income people improve their long-term economic prospects?  The 
United States has historically focused on a combination of income maintenance, consumption 
support, and work incentives to help families maintain a minimum level of subsistence.  In recent 
years, an additional approach has aimed to complement traditional policies by helping low-income 
households save and accumulate wealth.  These programs often provide subsidies to save for a 
home, get post-secondary education, open or run a business, save for retirement, or save for their 
children’s education.1 
                                                 
1
 Beyond the general goal of encouraging wealth accumulation, there are several motivations for encouraging saving by 
low-income people.  First, many public policies already encourage asset accumulation via saving incentives, housing 
subsidies, and other means.  Most benefits, however, accrue to people in the top half of the income distribution 
(Seidman, 2001; Sherraden, 1991; Woo, Schweke, & Buchholtz, 2004).  Second, compared to income-transfer 
approaches to poverty reduction, asset-development approaches may have greater potential to foster sustainable 
economic development (McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Moser & Dani, 2008).  Third, while the acquisition of major 
non-financial assets (e.g., a house) can transform a household’s standard of living, the up-front financial cost may be out 
of reach for low-income people (Shapiro, 2004).  Fourth, the process of accumulating assets may in itself alter people’s 
outlooks and choices, perhaps making them more future-oriented (Oyserman & Destin, 2010; Sherraden, 2001). Fifth, 
people need savings to weather temporary setbacks such as a spell of unemployment or an unexpected expense.  Sixth, 
some existing federal policies—such as asset tests for eligibility for particular programs—may discourage wealth 
accumulation by low-income households. See also Wolff (2001), Hurst and Ziliak (2006), Oliver and Shapiro (2006), 
McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam (2007), and Scholz and Seshadri (2009). 
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Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a policy tool designed to help low-income people 
accumulate wealth.  As described by Michael Sherraden (1991), IDAs provide people with saving 
accounts in which withdrawals are matched if they are used for qualified purposes.  IDAs were 
proposed as a universal and progressive system of accounts starting as early as birth. During a 
demonstration period, they have been implemented as a targeted savings strategy for low-income 
individuals. From 1999 through 2008, more than 50,000 IDAs were opened at 544 project sites 
through the federal Assets for Independence (AFI) Program, which provided grants to community-
based organizations and local governments (Department of Health and Human Services, 2010).  
Variants of IDAs are now in place or being proposed in numerous other countries, as are matched 
saving accounts for children (Deshpande & Zimmerman, 2010; Loke & Sherraden, 2009).  
Previous experimental research on IDAs is limited.2  In learn$ave, a randomized IDA experiment in 
Canada starting in 2001, IDAs had positive impacts on post-secondary education and small-business 
start-up, two of the qualified uses of contributions in that program (Leckie et al., 2010).  
The only randomized experiment with IDAs in the United States took place in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
from 1998 to 2003 at the Community Action Program of Tulsa County (CAPTC).  Eligible 
applicants—those who were employed and who had prior-year adjusted gross income of below 
150% of the poverty level—were randomly assigned into a treatment group or a control group.  
Treatment group members could open an IDA, and contributions of up to $750 per year for three 
years were matched at 2:1 if withdrawn and used for home purchases or at 1:1 if used for other 
qualified purposes, which included home repair, investing in a small business, post-secondary 
education, or saving for retirement.  Control group members were restricted from opening an IDA.  
All project participants were restricted from other homeownership programs at CAPTC.  After the 
four-year experimental program period, IDA eligibility was terminated for the treatment group, and 
members of both the treatment and control groups were released from restrictions on using other 
CAPTC programs.   
The effects of the experiment on homeownership and wealth through 2003 are evaluated in three 
recent studies that report similar results (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2008; Han, Grinstein-Weiss, & 
Sherraden, 2009; Mills et al., 2008a).3  The program had a positive and statistically significant impact 
                                                 
2
 IDAs have also been studied using non-experimental methods.  A number of studies (e.g., Mills et al., 2008b; 
Rademacher et al., 2010) have compared IDA participants to samples of non-IDA participants. These comparisons are 
less than ideal because, as we show below, people who signed up for the Tulsa experiment are a non-random sample of 
low-income households. Other studies examine associations of IDA program and participants characteristics with IDA 
saving outcomes (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007).  These studies are informative but they cannot control for self selection 
into IDAs nor were they designed with exogenous variation in program design that would enable simple impact tests.  
Another set of studies (Sherraden et al., 2005; Sherraden & McBride, 2010) report results of in-depth interviews with 
IDA participants. These analyses illuminate participation patterns in the IDA program and document participants’ 
assessment of results, and do not claim to test impacts.  
3
 Engelhardt et al. (2010) use IDA treatment status as an instrument for homeownership and find no net impact of 
homeownership on the provision of social capital. 
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on homeownership rates over the first five years.  Among households who rented at baseline, 
homeownership rates between 1998 and 2003 rose by 7 to 11 percentage points for treatment group 
members relative to control group members.  Estimated effects on other qualified uses of the 
withdrawals and on net worth were imprecise and often inconsistent in sign.   
These results can be described as short-term impacts.  Participants had three years to save in their 
IDAs, and then they had another six months to use their funds for matched purposes.  Longer-term 
analysis is important for understanding the benefits and costs of IDAs, for at least two reasons. 
First, longer-term effects are the ultimate goal of interventions to increase saving, and such effects 
may take time to develop.  For example, saving for a down payment may require more than three 
years, especially for low-income households.  People might initially use the IDA to invest in 
education, in which case their homeownership rates and financial wealth levels may not be affected 
until much later.  Starting a business may yield higher or lower returns during the start-up period 
relative to a longer period of time. As a result, long-term performance is an important aspect of 
possible IDA impact.  
Second, there is no experimental study on the long-term effects of IDAs on homeownership and, 
indeed, very little long-term experimental evidence regarding saving policies in general.  Analysis of 
other (non-saving) policies has shown that long-term effects can be stronger or weaker than short-
term effects.4  The incentives built into the Tulsa IDA experiment suggest one reason why the long-
term effects may be smaller than the short-term effects.  Specifically, treatment group members had 
incentives to purchase homes before the end of 2003 (to receive a 2:1 match) while control group 
members had incentives to delay home purchases until 2004 (when they would become eligible once 
again for a variety of CAPTC home-buyer assistance programs).  On the other hand, financial 
education and the impact of the very act of saving and owning wealth (as posited by Sherraden, 
1991) might spur members of the treatment group to even greater gains after the program ended in 
2003.  
This paper examines the effects of the Tulsa IDA program on homeownership rates in 2009 and on 
the duration of homeownership over the 1998-2009 period.  The analysis is based on a new survey 
of treatment and control group members taken about 10 years after the start of the experiment.  The 
hypothesis, formed at the outset of the experiment and tested here, is that IDAs will increase 
homeownership.  To provide some context, we show that between 1998 and 2009, homeownership 
rates increased dramatically for both the treatment and control groups.  This result speaks to the 
importance, when identifying the effects of an IDA program, of having a control group in order to 
account for the non-random selection of participants into an IDA and for location-specific 
influences on homeownership.    
                                                 
4
 See Almond and Currie (2010) for a discussion and review of long-term impacts of early childhood interventions and 
Chetty et al. (2010) for a recent contribution to that literature.   
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Our raw difference-in-difference estimates show a positive (5.5 percentage points) and marginally 
significant (p < 0.08) long-term impact of IDAs on the 2009 homeownership rate.  This result, 
however, is driven by differing homeownership rates for the treatment and control group at 
baseline.  Once we control for this, the difference-in-difference is 1.7 percentage points for owners 
and 2.7 percentage points for renters, with neither effect statistically significant.  Likewise, in 
ordinary least squares regressions and propensity score analyses, the 1998–2003 Tulsa IDA 
experiment has no statistically significant impact on homeownership after 10 years.  Combined with 
earlier results showing positive and significant impacts on homeownership through 2003, our 
findings are consistent with the incentives embedded in the program, which encouraged treatment 
group members to buy homes before the end of 2003 and encouraged control group members to 
postpone home purchase until 2004 or later, when they could take full advantage of IDAs and other 
homeownership programs at CAPTC.  Additionally, because the control group caught up quickly, 
we find that IDAs had no statistically significant impact on the duration of homeownership during 
the study period.  
We do find some evidence of program impacts on one population subgroup.  Over the ten-year 
period, IDAs raised homeownership rates and raised the duration of homeownership for 
households with above-sample-median incomes relative to those with below-sample-median 
incomes.  IDAs in the Tulsa experiment were targeted to those with low incomes, and sample 
median annual household income was $15,840.  However, there were no statistically significant 
effects for a variety of other subgroups tested.  
Besides providing the first evidence of long-term effects of IDAs on homeownership, this is the 
first study (to our knowledge) to examine the long-term effects of any randomized experiment on 
saving behavior, this despite a large literature on the effects of billions of dollars of annual public 
expenditure for subsidies for private saving.  The exogenous assignment of treatment status in the 
current paper creates a rare experiment on the impact on saving subsidies (see also Ashraf, Karlan, 
& Yin, 2006; Duflo et al., 2006; and Saez, 2009 for saving-related experiments).  Also, although it is 
not exclusively a first-time home-buyers program, the Tulsa IDA program provided strong 
incentives to purchase homes.  Engelhardt (1996, 1997) finds strong effects of a Canadian first-time 
home-buyer’s tax subsidy, but there is little evidence from the United States. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the experimental design.  Section 
III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics for the analytic sample. Section IV outlines 
our methods.  Sections V and VI present analysis of the effects of the IDA program on 
homeownership rates and the duration of homeownership over the ten-year period.  Section VII 
discusses issues relating to internal and external validity.  Section VIII interprets the results.   
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Experimental design 
The Tulsa experiment  
The Tulsa experiment was part of the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a set of 14 
philanthropically-funded local IDA programs begun in the late 1990s.5  The IDA program in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma was administered by CAPTC, and was the only ADD program that was implemented as a 
random assignment experiment.  Recruitment of participants for the experiment took place from 
October 1998 to December 1999.  CAPTC staff recruited participants through contact with people 
already associated with the organization through the receipt of other CAPTC services, links to other 
local social service agencies, and word-of-mouth.  Eligibility rules required applicants to be 
employed with household income below 150% of the federal poverty guideline.  No other limits 
were placed on applicants’ eligibility. 
Participants in the experiment were informed of the nature and goals of the IDA program and 
notified that they would not be able to use other matched savings programs at CAPTC nor could 
they receive any financial assistance for homeownership from CAPTC for the four years of the 
study period.  As a result, during the experimental period through 2003, treatment group members 
had access to the CAPTC IDA, while both control and treatment group members had available to 
them a set of other subsidy options at CAPTC that was less attractive than those available to the 
typical low-income household.  After 2003, treatments and controls reverted to being eligible for all 
CAPTC programs.  All sample members could use CAPTC services for tax preparation, 
employment, education, child care, and so on during the experiment period.  Control group 
members could receive homeownership counseling from CAPTC and, if they requested it, they were 
provided with general financial information and referrals to other agencies in the Tulsa area that 
provided similar services.  At these other agencies, controls were free to seek any service for which 
they qualified, including financial assistance for homeownership. 
Treatment group members had access to financial education, case management, and the Individual 
Development Account held at the Bank of Oklahoma. The account earned an interest rate of 2-3%.6  
Participants could receive matches of up to $750 in deposits each year, with deposits above $750 in 
a given year eligible to be matched in subsequent years.  Participants could make matchable deposits 
for 36 months after opening the account.  Unmatched withdrawals could be made at any time.  
Matched withdrawals could only be made six or more months after account opening.  Withdrawals 
were matched at a 2:1 rate for home purchase and a 1:1 rate for home repair, small business 
investment, post-secondary education, or retirement saving.  A participant who made the maximum 
                                                 
5
 The Corporation for Enterprise Development (now known as CFED) proposed and organized ADD.  Research on 
ADD was conceived and initiated by the Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis. 
For the ADD experiment, CSD organized selection of the site and the survey firm, and drafted the initial survey 
instrument. 
6
 There were no fees to open or withdraw from the account unless the respondent made more than three withdrawals in 
one year, which induced a $3 fee. They could also use direct deposit to transfer money automatically into the IDA.  
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matchable deposit in all three years could accumulate $6,750 for a home purchase or $4,500 for 
other qualified uses.  At the end of the program, participants could request to put any remaining 
IDA balance into a Roth IRA with a 1:1 match.  
The financial education component included both general money-management training and asset-
specific training.7  Program staff provided case management including assistance and consultation by 
phone or in-person, and they sent out monthly deposit reminder postcards.  Matches for home 
purchase were paid to the vendor directly from the bank.    
Shortly after completing a baseline survey (wave 1), each of the 1,103 participants was randomly 
assigned to either the treatment or control group.  Because of concerns about differential attrition, 
the initial assignment ratio was 5:6 for treatment and controls.  About halfway through recruitment, 
the assignment ratio was changed to 1:1.  The wave 2 survey was conducted between May 2000 and 
August 2001, about 18 months after random assignment.  An interview with respondents was first 
attempted by telephone.  If telephone attempts were unsuccessful, a field interviewer attempted to 
arrange an in-person interview at the respondent’s residence. The wave 3 survey followed the same 
process between January and September 2003, about 48 months after random assignment. 
Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone and personal interviewing methods.  
Data from these first three surveys were used in the studies cited above.8  
New data  
For the current study, we report on a fourth wave of data collection which started in August 2008, 
about 10 years after random assignment.9  Because 35 respondents to the baseline survey had died 
before the wave 4 survey, the potential sample for wave 4 was 1,068 respondents.  No differential 
efforts were used to track down treatment versus control group members, nor were any information 
sets used if they predominantly identified only treatment or control group members.  We imposed 
these constraints to ensure that we did not collect a sample of study participants that was biased 
with respect to the treatment.  Further, interviews were conducted at an even pace for both the 
treatment and control groups, which is important given that the recent economic downturn 
developed and worsened during the period of data collection.   
Data collection lasted about eight months and ended in March 2009.  The interviews were primarily 
                                                 
7
 Participants were required to attend a minimum of four hours of financial education before they were allowed to open 
the account, and to accrue 12 hours of general financial education, as well as some asset-specific training, before making 
a matched withdrawal.  The general financial education requirement consisted of six 2-hour courses on topics such as 
saving strategies, budgeting, credit repair, and financial planning. The asset-specific classes provided information on a 
particular asset investment. For example, participants who were saving for a home attended classes that addressed how 
to shop in the real estate market and how to work with real estate agents and loan officers.  
8
 These surveys were undertaken by Abt Associates.  See Mills et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the data and 
survey methods.  
9
 RTI International provided tracing, data collection, and data management services for wave 4.  The study was approved 
by the University of North Carolina Institutional Review Board on July 1, 2008.  
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in-person for participants living in greater Tulsa; the 17% of respondents who lived elsewhere were 
interviewed by telephone.  The primary survey method was changed from telephone interviews in 
earlier waves to personal interviews in the current survey in order to achieve higher response rates 
and to collect more complete data, especially for income and wealth (Biemer et al., 1991).  Wave 4 
questions retained the format and content of questions in the earlier surveys.  We also added some 
new questions, addressing respondents’ homeownership history and current economic, financial, 
demographic, community, social, and health status.   
As with earlier waves, the wave 4 survey asks participants ―snapshot‖ questions about their current 
homeownership status at the time of the survey.  Unlike other waves, however, the wave 4 survey 
also asks retrospective questions about their homeownership history.  Specifically, in wave 4, 
respondents were asked to report on their home ownership history starting in 1998: what their status 
was at that time; when they bought a house; when they sold it, when they bought another house, 
when they sold it, etc.  Using this information, we construct a homeownership history for each 
respondent from 1998 to 2009.10 
Preliminary Data Issues 
Table 1 reports sample sizes for each of the four survey waves. The wave 4 survey had an overall 
response rate of 80.1% of living baseline sample members, and included interviews with 855 
participants, including 407 for the treatment group (representing 78.6% of the treatment group), and 
448 with the control group (representing 81.5% of the control group).  This is a slightly higher 
response rate than at wave 3 (76%), despite the fact that the wave 4 survey took place roughly six 
years later.11  The relatively high response rate is likely due in part to the change of survey method 
from telephone to personal interviews.  Also, respondents were paid $50 to complete a wave 4 
interview, up from $35 in the earlier waves.12 
Table 2 compares the baseline characteristics of the wave 4 treatment group and the control group 
members.  The differences between groups were tested for significance using two-tailed t-tests and 
chi-square tests, as appropriate.  For the 27 economic and demographic variables shown in Table 2, 
some of which are described in Appendix 1, there is only one significant difference at (p < .05) 
between the groups.  Control group members were 7 percentage points more likely to own total 
assets worth more than $4,285 (three months of average income).  We note also that the 
                                                 
10
 There are inevitably some conflicts between what people report retrospectively in 2009 about homeownership in 
earlier years and what people reported in those earlier years as a ―snapshot.‖  In the data reported below in the text, we 
resolve those conflicts by allowing the ―snapshot‖ data to override the retrospective data. We have also performed all of 
the calculations ignoring the ―snapshot‖ data and the results are virtually identical.  Moreover, in both cases, the 
calculated retrospective homeownership rates in the years when the surveys were taken are very close to those using the 
―snapshot‖ data.  
11
 Among wave 3 respondents, 131 were not located in wave 4. Conversely, 146 respondents who did not participate in 
wave 3 were located and participated in wave 4.  
12
 Respondents in the last cohort of interviews in the baseline survey were the most difficult to reach and were provided 
$75 in incentives.  
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homeownership rate was 5 percentage points higher for the control group relative to the treatment 
group at baseline.  This difference is not statistically significant (p > 0.10), but it leads to misleading 
aggregate difference-in-difference results, as discussed in section IV.  
Table 1. Sample size by treatment status and survey wave 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
 n % n % n % n % 
Full sample 1103 100 933 84.6 840 76.2 855 80.1 
Controls 566 100 472 83.4 428 75.6 448 81.5 
Treatments 537 100 461 85.8 412 76.7 407 78.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The percent figures are calculated as a share of the 1,103 baseline sample members for waves 1, 2, and 
3, and as a share of the 1,068 baseline sample members who were still alive at the time of the wave 4 survey 
for wave 4. 
The baseline characteristics of the wave 4 sample are similar in all ways except homeownership rate 
to the baseline characteristics of the wave 3 sample examined in Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2008), and 
Mills et al. (2008a).  The average age is 36 years; median income is $1,320 per month, with more 
than 50% of the sample having at least ―some college‖ experience.  About 80% of the sample is 
female, 26% is married, 41% is black, and 84% own a bank account of some kind.  As noted in Mills 
et al. (2008a) and discussed further below, the sample is not representative of low-income 
households who would have been eligible for the CAPTC IDA.  Sample members have more 
education and are more likely to be single, female, and black than the population of IDA-eligible 
households.13  
                                                 
13
 Although Table 2 shows that the wave 4 sample is balanced in terms of almost all baseline characteristics, we also 
examined attrition patterns from the wave 1 to the wave 4 survey, regressing inclusion in the wave 4 survey on the 
baseline characteristics listed in Table 2, treatment status, and interaction terms between the characteristics and treatment 
status.  Attrition was not significantly related to treatment status, baseline homeownership or their interaction (at p < 
0.05), but was correlated with a few variables, including one age category, car ownership, an economic strain scale, and 
interactions between the treatment status indicator and one sample cohort and one liability category.  All of these 
variables are controlled for in the regressions in Table 5, and none raise concerns about biased samples. 
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Table 2. Baseline characteristics of wave 4 treatment and control group respondents 
 N Treatment Control Difference SE P 
Homeownership 854 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.03 0.106 
Age       
  Under 25 853 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.289 
  23-35 853 0.34 0.37 -0.02 0.03 0.455 
  35-45 853 0.32 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.481 
  45-55 853 0.14 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.451 
  55-65 853 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.38 
  65+ 853 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.205 
Income       
  At least $1,000/month 855 0.71 0.72 0.00 0.03 0.897 
  At least $2,000/month 855 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.583 
  At least $3,000/month 855 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12 
  Income is missing 855 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.468 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 N Treatment Control Difference SE P 
Female 855 0.79 0.81 -0.01 0.03 0.656 
Education       
  Less than high school 854 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.812 
  High school graduate 854 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.981 
  Some college 854 0.41 0.42 -0.01 0.03 0.756 
  College degree or more 854 0.26 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.851 
Bank account ownership 840 0.86 0.83 0.04 0.02 0.139 
Race       
  White 855 0.44 0.47 -0.03 0.03 0.364 
  Black 855 0.43 0.39 0.04 0.03 0.243 
  Other 855 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.02 0.717 
Married 855 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.884 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 N Treatment Control Difference SE P 
Baseline survey cohort       
  Cohort 1-3 855 0.15 0.18 -0.03 0.03 0.252 
  Cohort 4-6 855 0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.03 0.673 
  Cohort 7-9 855 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.796 
  Cohort 10-12 855 0.28 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.698 
  Cohort 13 855 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.398 
Total assets       
  Total assets under $1,428 855 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.996 
  Total assets $1,429-$2,856 855 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.298 
  Total assets $2,857-$4,284 855 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.850 
  Total assets $4,285 and up 855 0.41 0.48 -0.07 0.03 0.041 
  Total assets missing 855 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.064 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 N Treatment Control Difference SE P 
Total debt       
  Total debt under $1,428 855 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.03 0.756 
  Total debt $1429-$2856 855 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.998 
  Total debt $2,857-$4284 855 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.834 
  Total debt $4285 and up 855 0.47 0.48 -0.01 0.03 0.816 
  Total debt missing 855 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.623 
Live in unsubsidized housing 848 0.75 0.72 0.00 0.03 0.959 
Have health insurance 853 0.59 0.58 0.02 0.03 0.587 
Own a business 854 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.608 
Own other property 855 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.248 
Have retirement savings 853 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.358 
Receive welfare payments 855 0.25 0.27 -0.02 0.03 0.523 
Own car 855 0.84 0.85 -0.01 0.02 0.755 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 N Treatment Control Difference SE P 
Satisfied with health 855 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.973 
Satisfied with financial situation 855 0.63 0.60 0.03 0.03 0.315 
Number of adults in the household 855 0.47 0.52 -0.05 0.05 0.308 
Number of children in the household 855 1.72 1.62 0.11 0.09 0.250 
Household goods ownership scale 855 2.70 2.70 0.00 0.16 0.992 
Economic strain scale 855 0.56 0.57 -0.01 0.02 0.516 
Giving help in the community scale 855 0.56 0.54 0.02 0.01 0.172 
Getting help in the community scale 855 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.955 
Community involvement scale 855 0.39 0.40 -0.01 0.02 0.546 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Reported p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
T E N - Y E A R  I M P A C T S  O F  I N D I V I D U A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  A C C O U N T S  O N  H O M E O W N E R S H I P  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
15 
Table 3 presents data on account utilization for treatment group members who were surveyed at 
wave 4.14  About 90% of treatment respondents opened an IDA account.  Among those who 
opened an account, 46% reported at enrollment that they intended to save for home purchase.  
More than 20% reported intending to save for home repair, and another 20% reported saving for 
retirement, while smaller shares reported saving for post-secondary education (8%) and for starting 
or running a small business (6 %).  Account holders made average deposits of about $1,855, not 
including matching funds.  Fewer than half of account holders made a matched withdrawal.  
Including the 10% of treatment group members who did not open an account, 58% of treatment 
group members never made a matched withdrawal.15   
Table 3. IDA utilization by wave 4 account holders 
Reason for saving Share of treatment 
group 
Average contribution 
($) 
Probability of making a 
matched withdrawal 
Any 1.000 1855 0.467 
Home purchase 0.462 1402 0.177 
Home repair 0.209 2278 0.792 
Small business 0.057 1526 0.714 
Education 0.076 2330 0.708 
Retirement saving 0.196 2384 0.476 
Source: MIS IDA. IDA participants could make more than one matched withdrawal and there is no 
requirement that the matched withdrawal was made for the originally reported motive for saving. 
Methodology 
We test the effect of being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. being eligible to participate in an 
IDA program) and thus provide ―intent-to-treat‖ estimates.16  We use three approaches: difference-
                                                 
14
 The data are taken from the Management Information System for Individual Development Accounts, which is an 
administrative data set designed by the Center for Social Development at Washington University.  Mills et al. (2008a) 
provide detailed analysis of IDA contribution and withdrawal patterns. 
15
 Administrative records reflect account transactions up to March of 2004. It is possible that some respondents may 
have withdrawn money, with or without a match, after this date. 
16
 The intent-to-treat estimates reported in this paper examine the average impact of exposure to the IDA for all 
members of the treatment group.  For some purposes, it is of interest to examine the impact on those who complied 
with the treatment protocols – an effect called the effect of the treatment on the treated (TOT).  The effect is given by 
TOT = ITT/p, where ITT is the intent-to-treat estimate and p is the probability that a treatment group member 
complied with the treatment.  In the IDA experiment, compliance could be defined in different ways.  For example, 90 
percent of the treatment group opened an IDA, and 81 percent of the treatment group contributed $100 or more (a 
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in-differences (DiD), ordinary least squares regression, and propensity score analysis.  In regression 
form, the difference-in-difference can be estimated as  
(1)                                        Y4i – Y1i = α + βTi + εi,  
where i indexes households, Y4 is an outcome measure in wave 4, Y1 is an outcome measure in wave 
1, T takes the value 1 for treatment group members and 0 for control group members, and ε is an 
error term.  In this specification, α measures the difference in outcomes from wave 1 to wave 4 for 
control members, and α + β represents the difference in outcomes from waves 1 to 4 for the 
treatment group. This implies that β is the difference-in-differences estimate, the amount by which 
the outcome changed over time for treatment group members net of any change in the outcome for 
control group members.   
We present OLS regressions of the form:  
(2)                                        Y4i   = α + βTi + γY1i +δXi + εi, 
where X is a vector of household characteristics, observed at baseline.  Controlling for X improves 
the efficiency of the estimates and removes the effects of sample imbalances in the baseline data 
related to the components of X.  Also, unlike equation (1), the specification in (2) allows the effect 
of the baseline outcome variable to vary from unity. 
With a dichotomous outcome variable like homeownership, the assumptions of ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) are violated.  With a sample size as large as ours, however, OLS estimates 
converge with probit estimates.  Because OLS is simpler than probit to interpret and present, we 
report OLS results below.  Probit produced similar results and so are not reported. 
We further test the sensitivity of the results with propensity scoring analysis (PSA), which uses the 
conditional probability of group membership to rebalance samples on baseline characteristics.  We 
employ two methods:  propensity score weighting (Guo & Fraser, 2010; Hirano & Imbens, 2001) 
and nearest-neighbor propensity score within-caliper matching (Rosenbaum, 2002).  Both 
approaches begin with the estimation of the propensity score using logistic regression to predict the 
probability of membership in the treatment group conditional on baseline household 
characteristics.17 
The first approach—based on weighting the observations—converts the estimated propensity score 
into a sampling weight that is applied to the OLS analysis.  Consistent with our ITT approach, we 
estimate weights for the average treatment effect, apply these weights to the OLS model described 
                                                                                                                                                             
measure that Schreiner, Margaret Clancy, and Sherraden (2002) define as a ―saver‖).   TOT estimates are not reported 
separately below.  TOT estimates have the same p-value as ITT estimates.  
17For the results reported in the text, we use all baseline covariates in the Appendix. The results, however, are insensitive 
to using subsets of the variables, except for baseline homeownership, as shown in the tables.  
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above, and estimate the treatment effect net of imbalance on observed baseline characteristics.  
The second approach—based on matching one treatment and one control group member to each 
other—creates a new sample within the data where treatment and control groups are finely balanced 
on observed baseline characteristics.  We use nearest-neighbor matching within a caliper, also called 
greedy matching.  This approach relies on there being a large region of common support between 
treatment and control cases where the odds of finding a close match on the propensity score are 
high.  Fortunately, our data have a broad region of common support, so 83% of treatment cases are 
matchable.  For the matching analysis, participants are randomly ordered and for each successive 
treated case, the closest control case (within 0.25 standard deviations) is identified and the two are 
matched.  We use 1:1 matching with no replacement.  A new dataset is constructed consisting only 
of matched treatment and control cases.  Before analysis, the balance of this new sample between 
treatment and control is checked on relevant covariates. 
Effects on Homeownership Rates 
Difference in differences  
Figures 1–3 and Table 4 illustrate key findings in the difference-in-difference analysis for 
homeownership rates, using data on all 855 wave 4 respondents, less 3 cases who had missing 
information on homeownership.   
Figure 1. Homeownership rates over time by treatment and control 
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Figure 2. Homeownership rates over time by treatment and control, baseline renters 
 
Figure 3. Homeownership rates over time by treatment and control, baseline owners 
 
There are several important points.  First, homeownership rates among both treatment group 
members and control group members increased considerably over the 10-year period.  As shown in 
Figure 1, for the control group as a whole, the homeownership rate rose from 25.8% to 51.6%, an 
increase of 25.8 percentage points, or 100%.  For the treatment group, the homeownership rate rose 
from 21.2% to 52.5%, an increase of 31.3 percentage points, or 148%.  The strong increase in 
homeownership among the control group reflects an underlying trend for this population, rather 
than an IDA effect, suggesting a positive homeownership environment and a highly motivated 
sample.  This again highlights the importance of having a randomized control group in analyzing 
IDA impacts.  
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Table 4. IDA treatment effects on homeownership at wave 4: Difference-in-difference estimates 
Homeownership rate Treatment Control Diff SE P 
Full sample (N=852)  
  Baseline 0.212 0.258 -0.046 0.029 0.943 
  Wave 4 0.525 0.516 0.009 0.034 0.397 
  Wave 4 – baseline 0.313 0.258 0.055 0.038 0.074 
Baseline owners (N=201)  
  Baseline 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000  
  Wave 4 0.791 0.774 0.017 0.059 0.389 
  Wave 4 – baseline -0.209 -0.226 0.017 0.058 0.389 
Baseline renters (N=651)  
  Baseline 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  Wave 4 0.453 0.426 0.027 0.039 0.243 
  Wave 4 – baseline 0.453 0.426 0.027 0.039 0.243 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Reported p-values are for 1-tailed tests. 
Second, the observed sample-wide difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate is that access to the 
CAPTC IDA raised homeownership rates by 5.5 percentage points, which is significant at p < 
0.08.18  Observed DiD estimates from a random-assignment study are frequently regarded as simple 
and clear and taken as the main measure of program impact.  In this particular case, however, the 
aggregate DiD measure of impact is misleading.  The reason is that DiD assumes that random 
assignment led to balanced baseline homeownership rates, but, as discussed above, this was not the 
case, whether due to sampling variation or to some unknown factor.  Treatment group members 
were about 5 percentage points less likely to own a home at baseline than were control group 
members. Because there are more baseline renters and fewer baseline owners in the treatment group 
than in the control group, and because the homeownership rate rose for baseline renters and fell for 
                                                 
18
 All of the p-values for treatment effects in this paper are reported using one-tailed tests. Because there is clear 
directional hypothesis for homeownership from the outset of ADD, a one-tailed test is appropriate.  For comparison, 
under a two-tailed test, the difference-in-difference estimate reported above would have a p-value of 0.148.  
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baseline owners over time, the aggregate DiD combines a causal effect and a composition effect and 
leads to an overstatement of the impact of IDAs on homeownership. 
The issue can be seen most clearly by comparing the sample-wide results with those for baseline 
owners and baseline renters, two groups that are mutually exclusive and that exhaustively cover the 
whole sample.  The DiD estimate is 1.7 percentage points for baseline homeowners and 2.7 
percentage points for baseline renters, and neither effect is statistically significant.  If the baseline 
homeownership rates were the same for the treatment and control groups, the sample-wide DiD 
would be a weighted average of the DiD for owners and the DiD for renters, with the weights being 
the baseline homeownership rate and 1 minus that rate, respectively.  However, when the 
homeownership rates differ in the treatment and control group at baseline—even when the 
difference is not statistically significant—the sample-wide DiD need not fall between the owner and 
renter effects, and can be driven instead by the differing sample compositions at baseline.  
We provide details on these observations in Appendix 2.  The key point is that, in this particular 
case, the sample-wide DiD estimates are not reliable indicators of the program’s impact. Instead, 
more representative estimates come from the disaggregated DiD and the regression results 
presented below.   
OLS and propensity scoring  
The first row of Table 5 presents OLS regressions.19  The estimate in the first row and first column 
of Table 5 estimates (2) with the right-hand side consisting of only a constant, baseline 
homeownership status, and treatment status.  This specification generalizes the DiD estimate by 
allowing the coefficient on baseline homeownership status to vary from unity.  In fact, the 
coefficient estimate on homeownership status differs greatly from unity.  In the full sample, the 
estimated treatment effects imply that the Tulsa IDA program increased homeownership rates by 
1.9 percentage points.  Controlling for other covariates in the second column, raises the estimated 
impact to 2.9 percentage points. Neither estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Appendix Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients for the other covariates.20  The last four 
estimates in the first panel of Table 5 report OLS results for baseline owners and baseline renters 
separately, with and without controls for covariates.  The estimated treatment effects range from 1 
to 3 percentage points and are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
                                                 
19
 Due to missing data for some respondents, the sample in the Table 5 regressions is reduced to 823 households. 
20
 The regressions show that, controlling for other factors, respondents were more likely to own a home at wave 4 if, at 
baseline, they owned a home, held a bank account, were in the top income bracket, lived in unsubsidized rental housing, 
held significant amounts of household goods, and were satisfied with their health.  They were less likely to own a home if 
in the age ranges of 25–45 or over 65.   
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Table 5. IDA treatment effects on homeownership at wave 4: OLS and propensity score estimates 
 Full sample Baseline owners Baseline renters 
 b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] 
Control for covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
OLS regressions  N=823 N=197 N=626 
Treatment status 0.019 0.029 0.016 -0.012 0.02 0.030 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.060) (0.066) (0.040) (0.039) 
 [0.283] [0.193] [0.397] [0.571] [0.304] [0.22] 
Homeownership 0.340 0.0240 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.039) (0.049)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
Propensity score—
weighted regressions 
N=823 N=197 N=626 
 0.029 0.029 0.016 -0.016 0.033 0.026 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.060) (0.069) (0.040) (0.039) 
 [0.197] [0.19] [0.395] [0.591] [0.206] [0.254] 
Homeownership 0.349 0.259 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.036) (0.047)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
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Table 5. (continued) 
 Full sample Baseline owners Baseline renters 
 b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] 
Propensity score—
matching regressions 
N=650 N=145 N=505 
Treatment status 0.009 0.004 0.018 -0.035 0.007 0.005 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.071) (0.081) (0.044) (0.043) 
 [0.404] [0.455] [0.401] [0.668] [0.440] [0.456] 
Homeownership 0.328 0.225 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.045) (0.056)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
Source: Authors’ calculations. Reported p-values represent 1-tailed tests for treatment status, 2-tailed tests for 
baseline home ownership status. 
The second and third panels of Table 5 report treatment effects estimated using the propensity score 
weighting and matching methods described above.21 The results are similar to the OLS analysis.  For 
the full sample, propensity scores with weighted regressions yield treatment effect estimates at 2.9 
percentage points, and propensity scores using matched regressions yield estimates of less than 1 
percentage point. Neither estimate is statistically significant.  Adding control variables beyond 
baseline homeownership has little effect on the impact estimates.  The other columns show that 
treatment effects for baseline homeowners are less than 2 percentage points and sometimes 
negative, while treatment effects for baseline renters are about 3 percentage points in the weighted 
regressions and less than 1 percentage point in the matching regressions.  None of the estimates are 
significant at conventional levels.   
Year-by-year patterns 
The analysis of homeownership described above uses information from ―snapshot‖ questions about 
respondents’ current homeownership status at the time of the surveys.  We now turn to the new 
wave 4 survey questions, described above, about retrospective homeownership patterns.  We use 
these data to explore the year-by-year changes in homeownership, seeking insight about the reasons 
                                                 
21
 The propensity score greedy matching method reduced the sample from 823 to 650 since, as described above, each 
treatment group member was matched to at most one control, and only matched pairs were included in the sample. 
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the treatment effects for 2003 and 2009 differ. 
Figure 4 shows year-by-year homeownership rates using the retrospective data.  The two middle 
lines show the homeownership rate for the treatment group and the control group as a whole.  The 
control group starts the period with a higher homeownership rate, but in no year is the difference 
between the treatment group and the control group statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The two top lines show that baseline homeowners in both groups experienced declines in home 
ownership over time.   
Figure 4. Year-to-year homeownership rate  
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The most interesting results involve baseline renters.22  By the end of the program period in 2003, 
the treatment group’s increase in homeownership rate is higher than that of the control group by 4.4 
percentage points (p < 0.12).23  After the experiment ends, however, the difference declines rapidly.  
The homeownership rate for baseline renters in the treatment group did not increase from 2003 to 
2004, allowing the control group, whose homeownership rate continued to rise in 2004, to catch up.  
This temporal pattern is consistent with the role played by the incentives in the program, whereby 
the treatment group had incentives to accelerate home purchases to 2003 and earlier, while the 
control group had incentives to delay such purchases until after 2003.   
Estimates by subgroup  
Table 6 returns to the OLS framework and examines 2009 treatment effects by subgroup, following 
Mills et al. (2008a).  The table presents impact estimates for each subgroup and Chi-square tests on 
the equality of estimated treatment effects between subgroups.  The one statistically significant 
heterogeneous treatment effect is on subgroups defined by income.  Among respondents with 
income above the sample median ($15,840 per year), the IDA raised the homeownership rate by 
10.6 percentage points (p < .02) for the treatment group relative to those in the control group, and 
this result is statistically different from the treatment effect for respondents with income below the 
median.  This suggests that treatment group members with higher baseline incomes may respond 
differently to the treatment than those whose household income is below the median.  These results 
mirror findings in Mills et al. (2008a) for the period through 2003.  
Table 6. IDA treatment effects on home ownership at wave 4: OLS estimates for subsamples 
 b p b p 
Race White Non-white 
  Treatment effect -0.003 0.945 -0.003 0.942 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.000 0.999   
Age 35 and over Under 35 
  Treatment effect 0.012 0.777 0.039 0.383 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.184 0.668   
                                                 
22
 In each group, about 8% of baseline renters reported buying a home in the year of the baseline interview but after the 
interview date.  
23
 By way of comparison, the analogous finding from Mills et al. (2008a), for all renters, is an estimated treatment effect 
of 6.9 percentage points with a p-value of .058.  
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Table 6. (continued) 
 b p b p 
Income Median income and above Below median income 
  Treatment effect 0.106 0.018 -0.045 0.313 
  Difference in treatment effect 5.760 0.016   
Education More than HS HS or less 
  Treatment effect 0.018 0.640 0.040 0.467 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.105 0.745   
Children in the household Has children No children 
  Treatment effect 0.027 0.447 -0.045 0.503 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.899 0.343   
Survey cohort Cohort 12 or 13 Earlier cohorts 
  Treatment effect 0.007 0.913 0.015 0.684 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.012 0.912   
Single motherhood Single mother Not single mother 
  Treatment effect -0.020 0.679 0.038 0.368 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.823 0.364   
Banked Banked Unbanked 
  Treatment effect 0.018 0.606 0.021 0.762 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.002 0.968   
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Table 6. (continued) 
 b p b p 
Welfare recipient Welfare recipient Non-recipient 
  Treatment effect 0.010 0.864 0.012 0.753 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.001 0.979   
Car ownership Owns car No car 
  Treatment effect 0.029 0.395 0.042 0.629 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.019 0.890   
Health insurance Insured Uninsured 
  Treatment effect 0.015 0.718 0.016 0.751 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.000 0.989   
Marital status Married Not married 
  Treatment effect 0.073 0.235 0.000 0.997 
  Difference in treatment effect 1.035 0.309   
Source: Authors’ calculations. Reported p-values are for 1-tailed tests for treatment effects, 2-tailed tests for 
differences in treatment effects. 
Effects on Duration of Homeownership 
Even if the Tulsa IDA program did not affect the long-term homeownership rate for the full 
sample, it could still have an impact by significantly increasing the amount of time that respondents 
spend as homeowners.  Using the retrospective data discussed above, we estimate the number of 
years of homeownership during the 10-year period for each respondent.   
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Figure 5. Duration of homeownership by treatment status and baseline homeownership 
 
As shown in Figure 5, control group members averaged 4.5 years of homeownership between 1999 
and 2009, whereas treatment group members averaged 4.4 years of homeownership.  The difference 
between the two groups is not significant at conventional levels.  Moreover, the aggregate 
comparison is biased by the higher rates of baseline homeownership in the control group. As before, 
the bias is resolved by examining trends for baseline owners and baseline renters separately and by 
regression analysis that controls for initial baseline status.  Figure 5 shows that, when looking at 
baseline owners and baseline renters separately, treatment group members experienced slightly 
longer average durations of homeownership during the sample period.  The differences, however, 
are not statistically significant. 
Table 7 presents regression analysis of the effects of the IDA program on the duration of 
homeownership with the same format and same right-hand side variables as in Table 5.  The 18 
regressions combine three methods (OLS, propensity score weighting, and propensity score 
matching), three samples (all respondents, baseline renters, and baseline home owners), and 
alternatively do and do not control for covariates.  The estimated treatment effects are in the range 
of about 0.1 to 0.4 years, but none of the effects are statistically significantly different from zero.   
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Table 7. IDA treatment effects on duration of homeownership: OLS and propensity score estimates 
 Full sample Baseline owners Baseline renters 
 b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] b/(se)/[p] 
Control for covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes 
OLS regressions N=823 N=197 N=626 
  Treatment status 0.122 0.189 0.174 0.352 0.106 0.201 
 (0.236) (0.230) (0.383) (0.424) (0.286) (0.278) 
 [0.303] [0.206] [0.326] [0.204] [0.356] [0.235] 
  Homeownership 5.436 4.551 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.277) (0.344)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
Propensity score—
weighted regressions 
N=823 N=197 N=626 
  Treatment status 0.185 0.18 0.144 0.324 0.199 0.171 
 (0.240) (0.227) (0.382) (0.435) (0.292) (0.273) 
 [0.220] [0.213] [0.354] [0.229] [0.248] [0.267] 
  Homeownership 5.470 4.603 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.240) (0.342)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
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Propensity score—
matching regressions 
N=650 N=145 N=505 
  Treatment status 0.075 0.077 0.259 0.476 0.022 0.075 
 (0.266) (0.253) (0.435) (0.500) (0.319) (0.300) 
 [0.390] [0.380] [0.277] [0.172] [0.473] [0.402] 
  Homeownership 5.441 4.542 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.320) (0.390)     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
Source: Authors’ calculations. Reported p-values represent 1-tailed test for treatment status, 2-tailed 
tests for baseline home ownership status. 
Table 8 presents the effects of IDAs on the duration of homeownership for the same sub-samples 
and in the same format as in Table 6.  As with the analysis of homeownership at wave 4 presented 
above, IDA treatment affected high-income respondents relative to low-income respondents.  The 
duration of homeownership for treatment group members earning above the sample median income 
was 0.87 years longer than for control group members earning above the sample median income, a 
statistically significant difference (p < 0.01).  
Table 8. IDA treatment effects on duration of home ownership: OLS estimates for subsamples 
 b p b p 
Race White Non-white 
  Treatment effect 0.02 0.4775 -0.111 0.628 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.131 0.788   
Age 35 and over Under 35 
  Treatment effect -0.102 0.6115 0.091 0.398 
  Difference in treatment effect -0.193 0.701   
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Table 8. (continued)   
 b p b p 
Income Median income and above Below median income 
  Treatment effect 0.87 0.007 -0.299 0.806 
  Difference in treatment effect 1.169 0.018   
Education More than HS HS or less 
  Treatment effect 0.16 0.2945 0.152 0.36 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.008 0.988   
Children in the household Has children No children 
  Treatment effect 0.052 0.4255 -0.038 0.528 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.09 0.881   
Survey cohort Cohort 12 or 13 Earlier cohorts 
  Treatment effect 0.111 0.401 0.052 0.43 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.059 0.911   
Single motherhood Single mother Not single mother 
  Treatment effect -0.238 0.744 0.207 0.272 
  Difference in treatment effect -0.445 0.371   
Banked Banked Unbanked 
  Treatment effect 0.21 0.221 0.14 0.4 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.07 0.91   
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Table 8. (continued) 
 b p b p 
Welfare recipient Welfare recipient Non-recipient 
  Treatment effect -0.144 0.629 0.103 0.365 
  Difference in treatment effect -0.247 0.641   
Car ownership Owns car No car 
  Treatment effect 0.225 0.2005 -0.561 0.842 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.786 0.205   
Health insurance Insured Uninsured 
  Treatment effect 0.473 0.0765 -0.452 0.884 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.925 0.066   
Marital status Married Not married 
  Treatment effect 0.03 0.4765 -0.058 0.58 
  Difference in treatment effect 0.088 0.881   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Discussion 
Internal validity  
The internal validity of the experiment depends on how well it was implemented.  We discuss two 
countervailing concerns: crossovers and other services.  Each issue applies only to the period 
through 2003 rather than the entire period through 2009.   
For the first issue, a formal definition of a crossover is a control group member who, during the 1998 
to 2003 period, received some part of the treatment—that is, opened an IDA or attended financial 
education classes.  Crossovers could also be defined more expansively as control group members 
who, during the experimental period, received access to CAPTC’s homebuyer-assistance programs 
(other than the IDA) or who were able to open an IDA at some other non-CAPTC location.   
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Larry L. Orr (1999) develops an intent-to-treat estimate adjusted for crossovers, ITTo, that is 
calculated as ITTo= ITT/(1–c), where ITT is the intent-to-treat estimate, c is the proportion of the 
control group represented by crossovers, and where it is assumed that all treatment group members 
participate in the treatment.24  This adjustment alters the magnitude of the estimated treatment 
effect, but does not alter its statistical significance.  We generalize this formula to allow for less than 
100% participation by members of the treatment group (p<1) in IDAs, in which case the resulting 
adjustment is ITTo= ITT*p/(p-c).25  
Table 9. Utilization of CAPTC services during the experimental period 
 N Treatment Control Difference P 
Social programs 807 0.121 0.086 0.035 0.095 
Workforce programs 807 0.031 0.021 0.010 0.393 
Medical services 806 0.121 0.126 -0.005 0.828 
Youth programs 806 0.124 0.086 0.038 0.077 
Small business programs 807 0.067 0.012 0.055 0.000 
Home buying programs 806 0.233 0.067 0.166 0.000 
Education services 807 0.032 0.026 0.006 0.681 
Tax preparation services 807 0.463 0.379 0.084 0.016 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample for this table includes wave 4 respondents who were also in either 
wave 2 or wave 3. 
The data show 21 control group members who reported participating in an IDA program during the 
experimental period and an additional 27 who reported participating in CAPTC’s down payment 
assistance program, which was off-limits to both control and treatment group members under the 
experiment protocol.  Even if all 48 members were considered crossovers, c is small (.107 = 
                                                 
24
 In the IDA experiment, crossovers are probably not a representative sample of controls; they are probably more highly 
motivated to save and so would have done better than the typical control even in the absence of crossover.  As a result, 
dropping crossovers from the sample would undermine the balance between treatments and controls that is the purpose 
and chief benefit of random assignment.  
25
 The adjusted effect, ITTo = p(TOT) + (1-p)0 – c(TOT) - (1-c)0.  Collecting terms and noting that ITT = TOT/p 
yields the equation in the text.  The formula in the text collapses to the formula given by Orr when p=1.  Both formulas 
are actually upper bounds on the adjustment for crossovers, since they assume that each crossover household received 
the full treatment.  This assumption seems like an overstatement both because even those controls who opened an IDA 
are unlikely to have received all of the financial education and case management that treatment group members did and 
because (as discussed in the text below) more than half of those respondents we are counting as crossovers did not open 
an IDA. 
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48/448), the adjusted impact estimates are only slightly larger than the ITT estimates.26   
A second issue works in the opposite direction from the crossover effect.  As shown in Table 9, 
treatments were generally more likely than controls to use permitted non-IDA social services at 
CAPTC—especially tax-preparation services.  In addition, although 27 control group members used 
home buying assistance services for which they were not eligible, 90 treatment group members used 
such services.  It is not clear whether this is an outcome of the IDA program, part of the IDA 
treatment itself, or merely represents treatment group members misreporting permitted IDA-related 
home-buyer education as being part of another CAPTC program.  The main point, though, is that 
treatment and control groups received different sets of benefits from CAPTC. 
External validity  
Efforts to generalize the results estimated above for the Tulsa IDA experiment should account for 
five considerations.  
The first is the condition of housing markets in the United States.  The experimental period—1998 
through 2003—and up until about 2007, was a time of relatively easy homeownership.  During that 
time, favorable demographics, strong economic conditions, innovations in mortgage markets—
particularly sub-prime lending—and public policies and programs supporting homeownership all 
worked to increase the homeownership rate in aggregate and among low-income households in 
particular (Bostic &Lee, 2008; Herbert & Belsky, 2008).  The general condition of United States 
housing markets during this period probably contributed to the large increase in homeownership 
rates for both the treatment and control groups.  In a housing market where obtaining loans is more 
difficult, IDA program participation may have a stronger impact on home purchase. 
A second issue is the housing market in Tulsa.  Housing costs in the Tulsa area were substantially 
below national averages during the experiment, making homeownership even more affordable for 
low-income people.27   
A third issue is the availability of other local homeownership assistance.  Tulsa seems to have had 
several affordable-housing programs during the study period, which offered financial assistance.  For 
example, Housing Partners of Tulsa offered down payment and closing cost assistance equal to 5% 
of the purchase price upon completion of a home buyer education program (Tulsa Housing 
Authority, 2008).  No matched savings were required to receive those funds. 28   IDA programs in 
                                                 
26
 As an example of the magnitude of the effect, a 2 percentage point ITT effect would imply a 2.27 percentage point 
adjusted effect when c = .107 and p (IDA participation) = .90.  
27
 The median home price in Tulsa County was $60,300 in 1990, $91,700 in 2001, and $120,000 in 2007 (American 
Community Survey, 2007; Ard & Puckett, 2002).  In 2009, the median home price to income ratio for Tulsa County was 
2.8, compared to 6.2 for the nation (National Association of Realtors, 2009).  
28
 Other evidence that may be indicative of the availability of homebuyer assistance programs in Tulsa is the fact that 
about 90% of both treatment and control group members with mortgages held fixed-rate mortgages, during a period of 
heavy sub-prime lending that tended to feature adjustable rates.    
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areas that do not have other effective and competing homebuyer assistance programs may have 
stronger impacts.  
A fourth issue has to do with program design.  The Tulsa IDA program was among the first 
programs in the country when it started in 1998.  Based on field experience, many current IDA 
programs are structured differently in terms of match rates, maximum available matches, duration, 
qualified uses of the funds, and so on.  For example, most of the IDA programs today, funded 
through the federal AFI program, offer a five-year saving period (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2010).  Alternative program designs may result in different program impacts.   
Fifth, although the sample in Tulsa may well be a representative subsample of the population most 
interested in IDAs, it was not a representative sample of all qualified households.  Mills et al. (2008a) 
find substantial differences between Tulsa IDA respondents and IDA-eligible samples drawn from 
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances and from 2000 Census data for the greater Tulsa area.  Study 
participants were more educated, and were more likely to be single, female, and black than the 
comparison samples of IDA-eligible households.  The impact of IDA program participation on a 
more representative sample of eligible participants may vary from those reported here, although our 
subgroup analysis suggests that, other than income, there were no statistically significant differences 
within subgroups.  
To provide additional evidence on this, we drew a sample from the 1999 Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) based on the eligibility rules for the Tulsa IDA.  The time elapsed between the 
1999 and 2007 waves of the PSID is roughly comparable to the period between the wave 1 and 
wave 4 surveys described above.  Table 10 shows substantial differences in the increase in 
homeownership between the PSID sample and the Tulsa control group.  In the PSID sample, the 
homeownership rate rose by 14 percentage points, from 30% in 1999 to 43% in 2007.  In contrast, 
among Tulsa control group members, the homeownership rate rose by 29 percentage points, from 
24% in 1998-9 to 53% by 2009.  Among renters in the initial period, the increase in homeownership 
rates was 19 percentage points higher in the Tulsa control group than in the PSID subsample.  All of 
these differences are highly significant.29  These results may suggest that controls in the CAPTC 
experiment either were more motivated to purchase homes or faced more favorable housing market 
and housing assistance conditions than the general US population with similar observed 
characteristics.  This also demonstrates the importance of using a randomized evaluation to study 
the effects of IDAs, rather than drawing on a nonrandomized sample of observationally equivalent 
households that did not self-select into an IDA experiment.   
 
                                                 
29
 One potential concern with this comparison is that even after selecting for IDA eligibility in 1999, the PSID sample 
was substantially different from the ADD sample on demographic and financial characteristics.  In sensitivity analysis, we 
reweighted the samples using propensity score radius matching, and the basic finding did not change.  
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Table 10. Change in homeownership rates: IDA control group sample versus IDA-eligible PSID 
sample 
 Tulsa IDA 
control group 
IDA-eligible 
PSID group 
Difference P 
Whole sample     
  Homeownership in wave 1/1999 0.24 0.30 -0.06 0.037 
  Homeownership in wave 4/2007 0.53 0.43 0.10 0.001 
  Difference 0.29 0.14 0.16 0.000 
Owners in wave 1/1999     
  Homeownership in wave 1/1999 1.00 1.00 0.00 - 
  Homeownership in wave 4/2007 0.79 0.84 -0.05 0.277 
  Difference -0.21 -0.16 -0.05 0.277 
Renters in wave 1/1999     
  Homeownership in wave 1/1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
  Homeownership in wave 4/2007 0.45 0.26 0.19 0.00 
  Difference 0.45 0.26 0.19 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Conclusion 
Based on a longitudinal random-assignment design, this paper presents evidence on the 10-year 
impacts of an IDA program on homeownership.  We find that both treatment and control group 
members experienced substantial and on-going increases in homeownership rates.  For the full 
sample, however, participation in the Tulsa IDA program did not result in a significantly higher 
homeownership rates 10 years later.  Earlier findings (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2008; Mills et al., 2008a) 
show a statistically significant programmatic effect on homeownership rates as of 2003.  The longer-
term findings show that the IDA program accelerated the onset of homeownership for treatment 
group households but, in the longer run, it did not result in a homeownership rate statistically 
different from the control group.  The gap in homeownership increase narrowed rapidly after the 
program ended in 2003, thus the IDA program did not statistically increase the duration of 
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homeownership during the 10-year period covered by this study.   
A plausible explanation for the pattern of results found—a positive effect through 2003 but no 
significant effect after 10 years—is that is that the specific design of the Tulsa IDA experiment 
created incentives for treatment group members to accelerate home purchases before 2003 and for 
control group members to delay purchases.  Specifically, treatment group members had incentives to 
accelerate home purchase given the 2:1 match contribution they could receive for home purchase, 
which was available only up to 2003.  Control group members had incentives to postpone purchases 
until the experiment ended in 2003, at which point they could take full advantage of the 
homeownership programs at CAPTC, including financial assistance for down payment and closing 
costs.   
Our results do show that assignment to the treatment group raised the long-term homeownership 
rate and duration of homeownership for people with above-sample median income ($15,840 
annually) at baseline.  This may indicate that while IDA programs are not effective in promoting 
homeownership among very-low income households, they can be effective for households with 
higher, although still modest, levels of income.  However, in multiple other subgroups, we were 
unable to detect any impact of IDAs. 
Future research should focus on several issues.  First, it is important to examine the long-term 
impact of the Tulsa IDA on other qualified uses of savings—home repair, small business, post-
secondary education, or saving for retirement—as well as other outcomes, such as income-to-needs 
ratios, poverty rates, mortgage choices, loan performance, and net worth.  There is some evidence 
that policy interventions can have longer-term effects through some channels even if the short-term 
effects through other channels fade out.  For example, small class size may have temporary impacts 
on test scores but longer-term impacts on non-cognitive aspects of behavior and earnings (Chetty et 
al., 2010).  It is important to know whether financial education, the encouragement to save, and the 
opportunity to have accumulated funds during the IDA program could have longer-term effects, 
even if controls had caught up six years after the program ended.  
Second, because IDAs are made up of a bundle of services, it would be valuable for both policy and 
research reasons to understand the channels through IDAs may affect behavior and well-being.  For 
example, experimental evidence from the Canadian learn$ave program indicates that financial features 
of the program (contribution level, matching rate, etc.) affected education outcomes, but the 
addition of financial education services did not (Leckie et al., 2010).  
Third, a question that may be of interest is why IDA participants—treatment and  control group 
members alike—raised their homeownership rates by more than a random sample of low-income 
households (as evidenced by the comparison with respondents from the PSID).  As noted above, 
some combination of different motivations for saving, different local housing markets,  and different 
exposure to assistance and education programs could have played important roles.  These issues, 
however, are left for future research.  
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Appendix 1. Coefficients for OLS regression (N=832) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b    p   
Treatment Status 0.028 0.193 
Homeownership  0.24 0.000*** 
Age   
25-35 -0.099 0.073 
35-45 -0.135 0.018* 
45-55 -0.168 0.010** 
55-65 -0.116 0.22 
65+ -0.586 0.002** 
Income   
Income at least $1,000/month 0.037 0.364 
Income at least $2,000/month 0.023 0.655 
Income at least $3,000/month -0.197 0.045* 
Income is missing 0.185 0.076 
Female -0.029 0.546 
Education   
High school graduate 0.01 0.883 
Some college 0.01 0.883 
College degree or more 0.078 0.305 
Bank account ownership 0.145 0.003** 
Race   
Black -0.022 0.576 
Other 0.066 0.206 
Married 0.023 0.63 
Baseline Survey Cohort   
Cohort 4-6 -0.061 0.252 
Cohort 7-9 -0.029 0.614 
Cohort 10-12 -0.078 0.13 
Cohort 13 -0.083 0.146 
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Appendix 1. (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. P-values represent 1-tailed tests for treatment status, 2-tailed tests for all other 
variables 
 
 b    p   
Total Assets   
Total Assets $1429-$2856 0.097 0.137 
Total Assets $2857-$4284 0.016 0.817 
Total Assets $4285 and up 0.061 0.283 
Total Assets missing -0.025 0.707 
Total Debt   
Total Debt $1429-$2856 0.001 0.989 
Total Debt $2857-$4284 -0.005 0.945 
Total Debt $4285 and up -0.028 0.563 
Total Debt missing -0.058 0.301 
Housing unsubsidized 0.102 0.020* 
Have health insurance 0.001 0.981 
Own a business -0.012 0.856 
Own other property 0.026 0.758 
Have retirement savings 0.041 0.496 
Receive welfare payments 0.026 0.505 
Own car -0.02 0.712 
Satisfied with health 0.166 0.001*** 
Satisfied with financial situation -0.035 0.365 
Number of adults in the household -0.01 0.715 
Number of children in the household -0.013 0.403 
Household goods ownership scale 0.032 0.000*** 
Economic strain scale 0.062 0.405 
Giving help in the community scale -0.145 0.147 
Getting help in the community scale 0.007 0.944 
Community involvement scale 0.149 0.075 
Intercept 0.171 0.223 
